| INTRODUCTION
How is personal identity affected by changes in the self over the course of time? How does the experience of a severe mental disorder impact on an individual's sense of self and personal identity? Do fluctuations in the self affect culpability for their actions? These questions are of interest to psychiatrists, philosophers, and legal scholars. However, all too often they are studied from within disciplinary silos.
We report on an interdisciplinary workshop that we organized, on "Mental disorder and self over time." The workshop took place on 1st
September, 2015, under the aegis of the European Research Council project "Self-Control and the Person: An inter-disciplinary account."
It followed in the footsteps of the Centre for the Humanities and Health, which aimed to facilitate interdisciplinary engagement of clinicians and philosophers. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] We designed the workshop to be clinically relevant; approximately half of the 41 participants were clinicians. We aimed to create a collaborative and exploratory atmosphere, bringing together participants from mental health, philosophical, and legal backgrounds. This allowed us to explore issues in the philosophy of personal identity as they Specific disorders have their own particular patterns, which can affect sense of self and personal identity in different ways. The workshop was divided into six sessions, each focusing on a different disorder: dementia, affective disorders, bipolar, psychotic disorders, borderline personality disorder, and anorexia nervosa. Each of these sessions opened with a 25-to 30-minute talk by someone with clinical experience, as a clinician or service user or both, followed by a 5-to 10-minute response from a philosopher and then discussion.
In this paper, we summarize the talks and responses, giving a flavour of the discussion and drawing some general conclusions. Five detailed papers, each based on one of the presentations given at this workshop, also appear in this issue, 6 -10 and 3 papers on the workshop theme have appeared in the previous philosophy thematic. [11] [12] [13] A podcast is available on the website of the Self-Control and the Person group, at http://www.selfcontrolandtheperson.weebly.com/podcasts.
the day by asking how the experience of dementia affects an individual's sense of self and personal identity over the course of time. She began by describing some of the apparent effects on selfhood and identity may accompany dementia and argued that, although dementia is often seen as synonymous with loss, the illness can also deliver remarkable insights into the capacity to navigate a fragmented identity, as well as reminding us vividly of the importance of a relational, interactive quality to identity. For those with personal experience of dementia and also within our wider culture, Brown explained dementia represents an archetype of loss of self and identity over time, which brings great sorrow and is rightly often met with horror, sadness, and shock. 14 All of the dementias and the fear of the late stages, with their overwhelming need and dependency, can impede any positive thinking concerning the intervening years and the possibility of living and dying better with dementia.
Dementia forces us to confront the possibility of living with a fragmented identity and the extent to which we all rely on a notion of psychological continuity, presenting ourselves to ourselves as a coherent self over time and creating a fiction around consistency. 15 Brown drew on the ideas of a broad range of thinkers to question this fiction, ranging from Hume's view of identity as no more than a series of perceptions over time to ideas found in postmodern, post-structuralist, and particularly continental psychoanalytic thought that the self we experience is a (necessary) fiction. 16 Dementia demonstrates that we can develop beyond the need or capacity for continuity and coherence.
Moreover, dementia highlights the relational element of selfhood, as we witness the adaptive, socially constructed self diminishing through the disease and a second, experiential self, comes to prominence. 17 Via Levinas and Lacan, we might ethically consider, instead, the relationship between development, mastery, and anxiety in relation to a post-memory, post-language self that evolves in the course of dementia. 18, 19 Brown argued that, if we can move beyond our con- To explore these questions further, Bland took the audience through a brief history of ideas about the self (including references herein [21] [22] [23] ).
She noted that there has been much emphasis within philosophy on the continuity of psychological features such as memory, beliefs, values, personality, and preferences as facilitating the continuity of the self over time.
She then pointed out that a theory of selfhood must, however, also allow for change over time and that this raises the question, "how much of your personality could you lose and still be you?" She noted also that these ideas are challenged from other perspectives including Buddhism, which reifies the dissolution of self as an ideal, raising another question, "Do we overvalue both psychological coherence and self?"
Bland explained that she is persuaded by a theory according to which we have no static selves but are in a constantly fluctuating state of becoming and actively constructing ourselves, in a way that is dependent on the social environment. She also proposed that the idea of an internal dialogue between different parts of the self is extremely apt clinically, giving the example of Freud in "Mourning and Melancholia" describing the hostile attack of the highly critical part (called superego by Freud) and the struggling self. 24 Connecting these ideas to the therapeutic task, Bland moved on to the experience of the self in affective disorder. She noted that at the milder end of low mood, there may be no radical disturbance in the sense of self, unlike the terror of disintegration that is part of psychotic depression. Part of the therapeutic work that can be done, she suggests, facilitates an adjustment to a new identity, which includes a vulnerability to a mood disorder, even if there is no discontinuity in the self. In other contexts, the therapeutic task is to support the repair of a painful "split" in the psyche that might be caused by a childhood trauma, which undermined the development of a coherent self.
In this therapeutic process, Bland suggests that narrative becomes crucial: The central offering is the co-construction of a narrative of the self that makes the terrifying and inexplicable take its place and thus become bearable. This "dialogical self" is a fluctuating movement around a central core, which we each construct in inner dialogue between parts of ourselves, and outer dialogues with others in social contexts.
In her response, Jillian Craigie, an ethicist at King's College
London, focused on a central idea in Bland's presentation that the healthy state is characterized by a continuity and coherence and mental ill health is characterized by a rupture in the self. 25 Craigie continued Bland's exploration of this idea by drawing in particular on the work of David Velleman. 26 Velleman, rightly in her view, worries about the idea seemingly implicit in coherence models such as Harry Frankfurt's that problematic emotions (those experienced as alien and not reflectively endorsed) should be repressed. 27 She notes that Velleman wonders whether this kind of response to incoherence within the self might even contribute to mental ill health. Could our striving for coherence and consistency undermine our mental health?
In close connection with Bland's ideas about the self, Craigie described how Velleman pushes back against monolithic notions of a true self that must be sustained over time, urging us embrace multidimensionality and complexity in our understanding of self. This presents a model of developmental achievement that does not involve the resolution of inconsistency, as many philosophers would have us believe is the ideal.
The discussion that followed revolved around question whether the proposed discontinuity in the self in affective disorder was a difference in kind or simply in degree, relative to ordinary experience. Bland was asked whether any particular philosophers had helped her in this area and suggested that different ideas were helpful in different contexts but that no particular theorist stood out.
| SESSION 3: BIPOLAR DISORDER
Clare Dolman, journalist and part-time PhD student at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, KCL, spoke from both a personal and a researcher's perspective on various aspects of bipolar disorder and identity: The effect of diagnosis, the relationship between the self in manic, depressive, and euthymic episodes, and the impact of the passage of time on memory and identity in bipolar disorder.
Dolman said that her first hospitalization and diagnosis caused a massive shift in identity, from being an ambitious and driven person to being a "mentally ill person" who would need to take medication the rest of her life to stay "sane" and who could not talk about it because of the stigma. The disorder affected how she saw her past and future. She reassessed important events and periods of her life in the light of the diagnosis. She was no longer sure she could become the sort of person she had imagined she would be: a high flying career woman and, even more importantly, a mother.
Dolman also explored how bipolar disorder fundamentally impacts identity. One of the definitions of the word "identity" is "the state or fact of remaining the same one, as under varying aspects or conditions." But bipolar disorder, by its very nature, involves widely discrepant views of the self during mania, depression, and normal functioning, ranging from inflated self-esteem and grandiosity to feelings of worthlessness. In particular, people with bipolar disorder see themselves differently during manic episodes than they do when they recall the episode from a euthymic state. 28 This leads to a conundrum: They take pills to stop themselves from turning into "a different person"-one who they may think is more quick-witted and energetic, more gregarious and attractive, but also less sensitive to other people's feelings, who can behave incredibly badly and generally become very irritating. Does the lithium keep them who they truly are or does it subdue a version of themselves, and a more creative one at that? 29, 30 Bipolar disorder also impacts on the relationship between memory and identity. Dolman is particularly interested in how the passage of time affects one's perception of self. We all construct our memories, which cumulatively contribute to our developing sense of identity. But people with bipolar disorder may interpret a formative moment differently depending on whether they are manic, depressive, or euthymic when they recall it. So the process of constructing self through memory will be more complex for with bipolar disorder, as their minds accommodate traces of several different interpretations of every event, each loaded with emotional salience, which go on accumulating over time.
Finally, Dolman noted that her psychiatrist did not believe manic depressives (as bipolar disorder was then called) needed anything but medication to return them to "normal." However, she thinks therapy can be extremely helpful-even essential-for people who receive a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. As well as taking the medication, they need to come to terms with the need to take it, and it helps if they can somehow assimilate the condition into their identity and make it a positive as well as a negative. have to accept that the person during the episode is them in some respects-to own their episodes and accept that they could do those things-and that the notion of "taking responsibility" could bear more philosophical scrutiny.
| SESSION 4: PSYCHOSIS
Eduardo Iacoponi, Consultant Psychiatrist at the South London and Maudsley NHS, explained why his main experience with patients suffering from psychosis is not actually of change but of an absence of and perhaps even a resistance to change. In the majority of cases, he sees patients without being invited. After attempting to establish basic facts to ascertain the presence and type of psychiatric problem, his therapeutic mission is to help to eliminate symptoms, to achieve functional and occupational recovery.
A typical clinical encounter pits friends, relatives, and clinicians against the patient. Friends and relatives see the patient's identity as disrupted, while clinicians immediately present their primary objective as ridding the patient of the psychosis, which is judged as wholly negative. By contrast, the patients do not accept this view and cling to their psychotic beliefs, asserting that they have always been as they are now. Thus, Iacoponi associates psychosis with a lack of change, a clinging to essential aspects of identity, and wonders whether part of psychosis might actually be a desperate resistance to change.
To illustrate these ideas, Iacoponi described some case studies.
One patient thinks she is the mother of Christ; another that her brain is being monitored by an international atomic agency; a third that his relatives were impostors who were fiddling with the internet and poisoning his food. The patient who believes herself to be monitored says that, despite the fear this causes, the worst and most intolerable possible outcome would be to find her beliefs to be mistaken.
In Iacoponi's third case study, the patient eventually retreats into himself and becomes passive and accommodating, appearing to lose all interest in external activities. Most challenging, perhaps, are such patients who, ultimately, overwhelmed by "negative symptoms," fall into a lack of the energy, which could maintain the hope of change.
He drew a comparison with the nymph Daphne in the Ovid's tale of Daphne and Apollo, who asks to be transformed into a tree, so as to resist Apollo and remain a virgin. Perhaps, he speculated, to talk about identity over time in psychosis, we need to think of more than one identity, and of the relationship between a core and essential identity that must remain, and an external, malleable one that will adapt and protect according to need.
In response, Tania Gergel, a philosopher at the Centre for Men- Within the context of the reductionist notion of personal identity, in which our continuing identity simply is constituted by the psychological connectedness between ourselves at the different moments of our lives, 31, 32 or the narrativist view of identity as some type of teleological coherence drawing the various moments of our lives together, 33, 34 it is hard to see where the psychotic "fracturing"
of identity could fit in. If we stick to such models, we may simply have to concede that, for Iacoponi's patients, especially those in whom the psychosis is most refractory, the onset of psychosis constitutes the loss of self. More worryingly, perhaps, in legal or ethical terms, such a view may lead us to see psychosis as the loss or diminution of personhood. To find, therefore, some way in which identity and personhood can be maintained within psychotic disorders, it seems that we need an alternative or adapted conceptual model of identity over time.
A key topic within the discussion was the tension between identity as the individual with psychosis sees themselves and their identity or loss of identity as it is perceived by others. If we try to find some way to accommodate the changes by concentrating on "character," sense of self and are still trying to work out who they are and who they want to be. Richards explained how anorexia shields them from confusion and offers identity during a time of identity crisis, allowing an unwell anorexic self to emerge in place of the authentic self.
Patients describe how anorexia becomes integral to their selves, not necessarily all encompassing, but a part of themselves. 41, 42 Richards explained how anorexia affects patients' values, their personalities, and their ways of thinking. There is a general societal tendency to associate negative values with fatness, but anorexics go beyond this, thinking that being fat is a failure and makes them unlovable; they put paramount importance on being thin, seeing their anorexia as indicating their superior willpower. They identify with the disorder, which is part of a broader personality style, and have difficulty envisaging their future self without anorexia. They worry that getting well would completely change them, turning them into different people. It would be a leap into the unknown, since many have never experienced a self without disorder. So, although patients may want to be free of eating problems, they do not necessarily want to be free of the disorder itself.
Richards said that these issues are exacerbated by the pro-ana sub-culture, which promotes anorexia as a lifestyle choice. Patients are looking for an identity and the culture provides a tribal identity, which legitimizes their anorexia.
According to Richards, the therapist has to try to get patients to see their anorexia as in battle with the healthy part of themselves, to get them to try to change. This requires them to tease apart the true self and the anorexic self. conflicts are settled; whether it is just that the strongest desire at the moment wins out or whether the person asks deeper questions about where the desire comes from and whether it really leads to a satisfying life. For Glover, part of the role of a therapist is to help self-creation.
We discussed the idea that patients should externalize the condition, and whether encouraging them to do so is problematic. Richards said that externalization works really well for some patients but has the opposite effect on others.
| CONCLUSION
The day's discussions focused on a broad range of conditions and a diversity of challenges in relation to the question of self over time within these various disorders. Despite this diversity, the centrality and importance of questions concerning selfhood to the issues that 
